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Abstract 
The transferability problem – whether the results of an experiment will 
transfer to a treatment population – affects not only Randomized Controlled 
Trials but any type of study. The problem for any given type of study can 
also, potentially, be addressed to some degree through many different types 
of study. The transferability problem for a given RCT can be investigated 
further through another RCT, but the variables to use in the further 
experiment must be discovered. This suggests we could do better on the 
epistemological problem of transferability by promoting, in the repeated 
process of formulating public health guidelines, feedback loops of 
information from the implementation setting back to researchers who are 
defining new studies.  
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Nancy is ultimately most concerned about how to determine the relevance of 
evidence to implementation of evidence-based policy guidelines, in other 
words, the transferability of study results to a population different from the 
one that was studied and in which procedures or conditions are not the same 
as those in the study. And she is concerned about the privileged position 
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are given in the ranking schemes for 
evidence-based policy, because as she sees it RCTs do not address this 
question while other methods do.  
RCTs are highly regarded because of their strength in ruling out 
confounding variables, but they can be weak on the transferability problem 
because the manipulations necessary for controlled experiment also 
guarantee that the setting and population are different from the situation and 
population targeted for application. However, both of these familiar points 
are simplifications that can be misleading. Some non-RCT type studies (e.g. 
soft interventions) can also be very good at ruling out confounding 
variables.1 And, as I will explain, the problems leading to the transferability 
problem – interacting variables and a difference between study and target 
                                                 
1 See F. Eberhardt and R. Sheines, "Interventions and Causal Inference" (2007), Philosophy of Science, 74, 
pp. 981–995. 
 3
populations – are present in any study, not unique to RCTs. In addition, 
there are well-known ways of addressing the transferability problem for 
RCTs, both by methods internal to such studies and by doing other studies 
and other types of study, as I will discuss.   
So, Nancy is right in that the crude evidence ranking system that 
portrays some methods as always better than others, is definitely not faithful 
to what statisticians and scientists know. Simplified schemes can make sense 
practically, though, as tools to help those evaluating large bodies of studies 
to stay at least in the ballpark of sound assessment of quality. The question 
about the rankings used in formulation of policy guidelines today may be 
whether the particular simplification with RCTs univocally on top is causing 
more distortion than it avoids, in the application of scientific evidence to 
policy. Any simplified scheme would be a distortion, though, because one 
method will be superior to another only given a situation and a set of 
background knowledge. There are general things that can be said about how 
suitability of a type of study varies with the situation, but they are not 
simple. So, the task seems to be to determine which distortions are least 
damaging. I will not try to answer that practical question, but I will suggest 
some practical measures in guideline formulation that could supplement the 
methods scientists already have for addressing the transferability problem. 
My suggestions have to do with more efficient flow of information from 
actual applications back to the research community for use in defining the 
next round of studies.   
 
A couple of preliminary observations: Nancy is concerned, as we 
should be, that in the focus on RCT we stop using knowledge that we got in 
other ways, knowledge that is not RCT-certified. However, the Scottish 
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Guidelines for use of evidence in medicine are impressive, I think, in how 
seriously they do take non-RCT studies despite the fact that they are not 
regarded as the gold standard. There seems also to be a high degree of 
respect for background knowledge not obtained through scientific studies, 
since typically every member of the Guidelines Committee who evaluates 
the scientific evidence is either a practitioner or patient representative, even 
if he or she is also a researcher. (This seems to be different from the U.S. 
Dept. of Education practice for committees formulating guidelines, where 
typically only one member of the team is a teacher and the rest pure 
researchers.) In the Scottish system, committee chairs are even given explicit 
instructions for insuring that the pre-existing hierarchy of status among 
health care professionals does not translate into disproportionate speaking 
time for high-status members, and suppression of valuable information from 
others.  
These features maximize use of members’ conscious knowledge, and 
also knowledge they might not even be able to articulate. Such background 
knowledge is brought to bear in the process of guideline formulation both in 
every participant’s evaluation of every study, and, especially, in the 
“considered judgment” form each fills out at the end of the process. In other 
words, the Scottish System respects and uses both explicit and tacit 
background knowledge. This shows remarkable respect for common sense – 
you have, for example, nurses evaluating scientific papers2 – and given the 
nationality, I suppose we should not be surprised. So, it seems to me that the 
Scottish are not throwing non-RCT evidence into the dustbin, although I 
have not seen similar features in other guideline formulation protocols.  
                                                 
2 Evaluation of research studies requires, of course, some sophistication with statistics which pure 
practitioners and patient representatives may not have. For this reason the Scottish system has an 
Information Officer who gives tutorials about how to evaluate statistically presented evidence. 
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Nancy’s big question is how to tell whether evidence is relevant to 
implementation in a population that was not the one studied. When should 
we think the results of a study are transferable to another population, and 
why? RCTs are not always inferior to other methods in virtue of having this 
problem, since any study, using any method, is done on a population which 
is not the same as the population targeted for treatment. The populations in 
RCTs can generally be expected to be more different from target populations 
than the populations of observational studies are, due to the contrivance 
required for the former.  However, the question will always arise how 
similar the study and target population need to be for the results to transfer, 
and the study in question will not be able to answer it, no matter what kind 
of study it is. Other studies and information will always be needed for that 
question. RCTs are not unlike other studies in that their transferability 
problem can also be addressed through further studies. I will discuss one 
such path below.  
Another problem for all studies that is relevant to transferability is the 
task of discerning interacting variables. I will describe how this problem 
arises for RCTs, but it is universal among methods. To get at the way the 
problem arises for RCTs I will first describe the advantages of this method. 
The crudeness of the picture I am about to draw will be evident to those 
acquainted with these things, but the points I need will, I think, survive this 
flattening. 
In an RCT, you have a treatment (or intervention), T, and you want to 
know whether it has a significant ability to cause a desired effect (or an 
undesired side effect), O, in everybody. A group of people will be 
administered the treatment. Control means there is a group of the same size 
as the group of people who get the treatment, and the control group doesn’t 
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get the treatment. If you didn’t have that group, you wouldn’t know whether 
improvement in the patients, say, was due to the treatment or would have 
happened anyway. 
 The following types of possibility remain, and illustrate a need for 
more than merely having a control group.  It could happen that there is a 
variable, V, positively relevant to producing O, and going into the 
experiment more people in the control group have it than people in the 
treatment group. Then T could have the same positive effect in the treatment 
group as V has in the control group, and if we didn’t know about V or didn’t 
take it into account we would conclude that T has no effect on its own, even 
though it does.  
Alternatively, the factor V could happen to be more widespread in the 
treatment group than in the control group, and we would wrongly end up 
thinking T has a bigger positive effect than it does. Some of that effect is 
from T, the rest is from V, but we don’t know about V so we attribute all of 
the effect to T. Or, it is possible that T has no effect, but if V is more 
widespread in the treatment population than in the control population, then 
we would end up wrongly thinking T has an effect. 
These possibilities are the main reasons why we need a randomization 
process (or a suitable functional equivalent)3 for assigning subjects to 
experimental vs. control groups. Perfect randomization means there are no 
systematic differences between the treatment and control groups. It is a 
situation where equal numbers of people in each group have traits like age, 
                                                 
3 It is a live issue between Bayesians and classical statisticians whether the process of choosing these 
groups by randomization has any benefit over choosing them by matching, that is, making sure for every 
(known) relevant trait, there are as many and like subjects in the control group as in the treatment group. 
Bayesians think the purpose of ruling out the possibilities in question is served equally well without a 
randomizing process to produce the similar profiles of the two groups. This dispute does not seem to me to 
make a difference to our questions here. So, when I say “RCT” I mean to be speaking also about Bayesian 
trials as far as possible. 
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gender, and health status with respect to particular conditions, etc. The 
bigger the groups studied the more likely that randomizing on these factors 
randomizes on all factors, known and unknown. Of course no particular 
study is ever perfect, but here we know how to take steps to improve the 
results, namely, use bigger populations, consider more variables, etc. 
Successful randomization will put equal numbers of subjects with the 
unknown V in both groups, so that V’s effect on O is distributed the same 
way in each group, and any difference in effect can be attributed to T. 
The problem relevant to our concerns here, and that it is hard to know 
how to resolve, comes even if we assume perfect randomization has been 
achieved.  This means that for every trait, the two populations are the same, 
or the same on average, with respect to unknown variables like V. The 
problem is, what if variable V is a causal factor that enhances or is needed to 
enable T to have the desired effect? Then even though V is present in both 
treatment and control populations in equal measure, the treatment group will 
show a higher effect on O than T could have produced alone. (We assume 
that V alone cannot produce the effect without T.) T has the potential to 
produce an effect in such a case, but without knowing about V we would 
overestimate its effect. Thus we would conclude that T produces the effect 
seen in the experiment pretty much regardless of what other properties are 
present, when the experiment shows at most that under some circumstances 
T has a causal power.  
So, a problem with RCTs is that although by isolating T as the 
treatment the RCT can show that T has causal potential,4 that particular 
RCT cannot show that T is a sufficient cause for bringing about the effect 
                                                 
4 This is so under certain assumptions about the functional form of the causal structure, e.g., linearity, as 
discussed below. 
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we see on O. There could be features present in the same distribution in both 
treatment and control populations (properties of the subjects, the 
implementation, or the background situation) that had a role, in conjunction 
with T, in bringing about O, and we are not going to see that in that study 
that showed a potential causal role for T. Randomization is a strong tool for 
ruling out confounders, but it does not enable us to see those unknown 
enabling and enhancing factors in the same experiment, the interaction 
effects.5  
This is one clear aspect of the problem involved in using experimental 
results to draw conclusions about what will work in real-life situations. For 
example, maybe the study takes place in a state where the drinking water 
contains unusually high levels of fluoride and that happens to make the drug 
work better on anyone who has the condition in question. Maybe it is even a 
necessary condition for the drug to work. In that case both treatment and 
control group will have an advantage that the target population won’t have. 
Or, it could be that administration of the medicine is a delicate enough affair 
that it requires skills that practitioners in many other regions won’t have. Or 
maybe longer classes were only able to raise test scores in the study 
population because good books were used, whereas the extra hours would be 
useless in other regions of the country where you don’t have anything but 
the same crappy books to read in the added time.  
This is one way that the transferability problem arises for RCTs. An 
RCT on T can provide evidence that T is a causal factor because it isolates T 
and rules out confounding variables. But that RCT doesn’t show T is 
sufficient for the degree of effect seen. And the randomization within that 
study can hide the other interacting factors, if there are any.  
                                                 
5 The same argument can be made, of course, for detracting factors. 
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However, we shouldn’t think that no consideration is given to the 
transferability problem of a RCT within that very study. In processing the 
data scientists can check subgroups of their subjects that have properties that 
have been measured and see if unexpected correlations show up. To check 
for unknown variables they can look for unexpected clusters in the data. Of 
course, only variables that are actually present in the experimental 
population can be found in these ways, but again, non-RCT study 
populations are also distinct from their target populations. One further way 
that RCTs can address this issue is to form their experimental population by 
taking random samples of the target population. There are a lot of tools for 
addressing the transferability problem, and probably their existence and 
importance should be stressed to all who carry out and use studies. 
 
Before discussing a positive suggestion, I will explain briefly why 
although Nancy’s language of capacities is a good way to describe what the 
transferability problem is (in a common special case), and how hard the 
problem is, I think that changing from the concept of cause to that of 
capacity will not give us tools to solve this problem. (I am not sure Nancy 
was claiming that, in any case.) T has a capacity to affect outcome O if 
under all conditions T has the ability to affect O. What this means, I take it, 
is that there is a set of conditions under which T will have some degree of 
effect on O, in the following way: T in conjunction with each and several of 
a certain set of other variables will have a range of distinct and 
distinguishable effects on O. Nancy wants to use this way of carving up the 
space to take knowledge of capacities and then plug the actual conditions at, 
say, different hospitals or schools, into the place of “other variables” and see 
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what the effect is that pops out. This will say whether the evidence applies to 
their situation or not. 
This conception of the situation explains intuitively what the problem 
of evidence-based implementation is. However, to take it as a solution 
requires supposing we have knowledge of capacities, and this is as hard as 
the problem was in the first place. Verification of a claim that T has a 
capacity in this sense looks to me to be roughly the same problem as 
verifying that T is a causal factor, since the claim looks to me equivalent to 
saying that there are A, .., F, such that T together with A causes degree x 
effect on O, and T together with B causes degree y effect on O, and etc. It 
looks like the only way you could verify that T has the capacity in question 
would be to verify that T and A together cause degree x effect on O, and T 
and B together cause degree y effect on O, etc.  
It is true, as just explained, that one RCT will not establish one of 
those conjuncts, but it can give evidence that there exist a range of 
conditions under which T causes some degree of effect on O. If capacity 
means that weaker existence claim, then it seems to me that an RCT on T 
would be one appropriate way to establish a capacity (not the only one). The 
natural way to establish a specific list of causal claims that constitutes the 
stronger claim of capacity would in this approach be to do an RCT on a new 
treatment, T’, which is composed of T in conjunction with another factor, A, 
and so on with all permutations of T with other factors. The question we 
need to answer for a capacities claim is the same as many instances of the 
one we need to answer for the causal formulation: What degree of effect 
does T’ (T plus A) have on O? and so on for T’’, T’’’, etc. In each step there 
will be those unknown variables discussed above with RCTs, but after the 
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trial on T’ that is a set now reduced by one, A. One RCT cannot solve its 
own transferability problem, but further RCTs can make headway on it.  
However, there is an important limitation on this picture of causal 
structure as a matter of capacities. As is clear from the capacity claim as a 
conjunction of causal factors, and from the analogy of the force diagram 
from physics, this picture assumes that the causes combine in a linear 
fashion. This is often the case, and it is often not the case; it could instead, 
for example, have a threshold structure, where one factor kicks in only if 
another goes above a certain value. In order to draw sound conclusions from 
RCTs or other studies, even about T being a causal factor in an outcome, we 
must make some assumption about the functional form of the combined 
causes in such a system. If we have reason to assume linearity -- and we may 
get such reason from studies that are not RCTs, -- then the studies will tell us 
more. If not, things are harder.  
We should, I think, resist the expectation that there will be a single 
time when the transferability problem for a study result is solved. But we 
can do better and worse depending on how much information is taken into 
account, and how wisely. Over time, with more information, we should be 
able to improve the soundness of our conclusions, and it is worth making 
explicit how that process goes, in order to see how it might be made more 
efficient. To understand what I will propose, consider an example, again 
involving RCTs: Suppose the treatment, T, is birth control pills (BCP), and 
the study population contains only women randomized between treatment 
and control groups over race, age, diet, smoking, and exercise. Suppose we 
find that the treatment group has an 11% higher chance of blood clot than 
the control group. What are we allowed to conclude for all women in the age 
range studied? 
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Suppose randomization was full over every trait, not just those 
mentioned, but there is a factor we don’t know about, call it FVL, equally 
present in treatment and control groups, that is (suppose an extreme case) 
necessary for BCP to cause blood clots and the two factors are mutually 
enhancing. There are two joint causes of the blood clots in the treatment 
group. In this case, the result 11% is definitely an overstatement of the blood 
clot risk for those women without FVL, and an understatement for those 
with FVL. Going with this for a policy warning to women might needlessly 
convince many women not to use BCP, and insufficiently alarm those in real 
danger.  
This kind of case happens all the time, and the recipe for imagining 
them is clear. Another such case: C and T are both populations with all, or 
average same per cent, unknown or unconsidered trait that is relevant to 
outcome. Suppose the T is longer school hours, GB is good books, and the 
outcome is higher test scores. Suppose you get an effect from T, longer 
school hours, on test scores, but GB is actually necessary for T to have that 
level of effect on O.  If the two factors are mutually enhancing, then 
randomizing for GB will hide the fact that GB was necessary for T to 
produce that degree of effect on O, and so it will hide the fact that this study 
that has everyone or average with GB, and shows on average an effect from 
T, is not generalizable to populations without GB. In this case the positive 
effect of longer hours is definitely overstated for populations without good 
books, and so for the general population. 
To address the transferability problem we can do another study taking 
T + GB as treatment, with three control groups: T only, GB only, and 
neither. In the other case, we could do another RCT in which T = BCP + 
FVL is tested against the three control groups. When you do that, you find 
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the FVL group with, say, 2% blood clots, the BCP group with, say, 0.5% 
blood clots, the group with neither factor with 0.1 % blood clots, and the 
BCP +FVL group at 20%. 
 
 If you apply BCP to women with no FVL then there’s almost no worry 
about blood clots. 
 
 If you apply BCP to women with FVL, you are courting disaster, and 
probably need a compensating treatment, if you prescribe at all. 
 
Guideline: Test women for FVL before prescribing BCP.  
 
Notice that this is not a definitive answer to the question under what specific 
set of circumstances, will BCP cause a significant rate of blood clots. There 
will not be a point in time when that is established, since there always may 
be other unknown “V”s. But no method can offer exhaustion of the possible 
relevant circumstances. This is not a distinctive problem of RCTs but of the 
finitude of human resources and time. However, studies over time, each 
intelligently related to all the previously gleaned information, do yield a 
process by which we can improve our epistemic situation in each new round 
of studies relative to the previous. This point is more general than RCTs; the 
studies you start with could be of any suitable type, and the studies that try 
to improve on it could surely be of any type that gave relevant information. 
The point is to commit to a process that uses the results of each round to 
improve on those of the next. 
There is a hard problem about how to engage in ever new rounds of 
the experimental process: though we know how to do an RCT on BCP + 
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FVL, how did we, and how are we going to, discover factors like FVL and 
good books as variables worthy of the next RCT? It would take infinite time 
to discover all of them, but we can do better or worse with the finite time 
that we have, and try to maximize the efficiency of this process of discovery. 
The question is How? I think that practical steps could be added to the 
guideline formulation procedure to encourage particular types of information 
flow in the system that would encourage more and faster discovery and use 
of such variables. 
There are at least two aspects of the problem of discovering new 
variables to study. One has to do with identification of fruitful variables, the 
other with transmission of that information to research scientists, since 
information about these potential variables will not only be discovered by 
them. Even if one thinks that RCTs are superior for certifying the causal 
potency of a factor, it cannot be denied that other types of study bring 
information as to which variables have a potential role and are plausibly 
worth further study. There are an infinite number of factors we could 
possibly test, but if, for example, we see in a quasi-experiment that one 
variable shows a trend suggesting causation of an effect, it would only be 
rational to prefer to do RCTs on this factor, taken as treatment, rather than to 
do such a trial on a randomly chosen variable we have no such information 
about. Non-RCT studies and background knowledge do well at identifying 
trends and potential causal factors, the most likely variables out of the 
infinite sea of factors most of which are irrelevant. 
What kind of evidence is there besides RCTs? There is common 
sense, practitioner experience, patient and patient representative testimony at 
the open session that the Scottish do every round, narrative evidence, 
observational studies (cohort studies, comparison studies), quasi-
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experiments. Notice that common sense would have told you, once you 
thought of it, that GB was really plausible as a causal factor. But only once 
you thought of it. It would be helpful for those evaluating evidence for 
policy guidelines to be looking for further factors to test, and be receptive to 
information from any relevant source.  
There are already several stages in the Scottish guideline process 
where this kind of information that could be useful for guiding future studies 
is collected from many sources. 
-- Knowledge of committee members   
-- Results of systematic literature survey on question (includes non-RCT 
studies) 
-- Peer Review of formulated guidelines 
-- National Open Session about formulated guidelines 
 
And though they are expensive, observational studies of actual 
implementation would provide information about how well the previous 
round of RCTs transferred, and which variables might be good for future 
RCTs. The Scottish System might think of seeking funding for this kind of 
research.  
These aspects have a role in collecting information about new 
possibly relevant variables. But the information also needs to go to the right 
places. There are some feedback loops already in the Scottish process, for 
taking that information back to the research community. But it would be 
useful to have more explicit methods in place for making sure that 
information has a direct path back to researchers. My proposal would be for 
more emphasis on those feedback loops.  
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First, I would suggest that the information officer instruct those 
evaluating the evidence that and why noticing and feeding back such 
information is crucial to improving the successful implementation of 
guidelines in the current step and the next. This connection could be 
emphasized to reviewers, to encourage them to leave no information about a 
potential factor behind. Also, at the peer review stage, the reviewers could 
not only evaluate the soundness of the guidelines relative to existing 
evidence, but also use their background knowledge to identify new potential 
variables, and have an efficient route already set up by which that gets fed 
back to the research community. Those reviewing studies could be 
encouraged to evaluate the transferability of the results of each study not 
only singly, but also by what the other current studies suggest on whether 
they will transfer. Additionally, information about potential new variables 
may arise in the National Open Meeting; having a process in place whereby 
this is noted and routed back – perhaps one committee member designated to 
do this – would bring more efficient use of the information. None of these 
additions to the process seem very costly, and information of the sort needed 
seems already to be present, latently, in the Scottish process, so the dividend 
for adding such procedures would seem to be high.  
 In summary, it seems to me that the transferability problem for a 
given RCT can be addressed through more RCTs, and through other types of 
study. All studies have a transferability problem, and all kinds of studies can 
potentially be used to address it. Though we cannot expect at any given time, 
now or in the future, to have achieved the full resolution of a transferability 
problem, we can do better in each round. The continuous cycle of studies 
that could over time improve our understanding of the transferability of a 
given result depends on identifying the next variables to do RCTs or other 
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studies on, and getting that information back to researchers. We already have 
latent information about this that probably goes unused or is used too slowly, 
and there are simple and low-cost procedural feedback loops that could help 
us use that information more efficiently. 
